Loading ...The Outfield Chronicles Part 1: When Should Heyward Get The Call?
By CapitolAvenueClub | February 8, 2010
Should the Braves begin the 2010 season with Jason Heyward as their starting right fielder? It’s a complicated question that deserves a complex answer, or at least a blog post full of mostly bullshit, given the uncertainty of it all.
At this point–and barring an unexpected (at this point) Johnny Damon signing or some other scenario that involves Frank Wren waving a wand and an outfielder coming out of a hat–it appears that the Braves will begin the season with Jason Heyward in RF. The organization isn’t saying that, of course. They’re saying things like, “We’re going to give him the opportunity to win the job this spring”. Which, to me, means they’re going to give him the job. There was a somewhat similar scenario last season when Jordan Schafer was given the opportunity to win the starting CF job, and he won it out of camp. He was actually probably the best outfielder on the team at 22 years old until he hurt his wrist and hid the injury from the organization for nearly two months, which speaks volumes about the quality of the outfielders the Braves possessed last spring. Anyway, I digress.
The outfield depth chart is significantly better than it was a year ago, but Heyward could still be a huge upgrade to the roster. First of all, let’s look at who he’d be replacing.
On the roster, he’d be replacing some run-of-the-mill AAAA outfielder, probably. That’s who would sit in his roster spot for the first couple of months while his service clock doesn’t tick in Gwinnett. However, that alleged AAAA outfielder wouldn’t be playing very much, Heyward would be the team’s starting right fielder.
If Heyward fails to win the job out of spring training, the Braves will likely enter ‘09 with an outfield alignment of Diaz-McLouth-M. Cabrera, left-to-right. If he does, we’re looking at a Diaz/Cabrera platoon in LF, McLouth in CF, and Heyward in RF. So, if Heyward makes the team, Diaz doesn’t hit against righties and Cabrera doesn’t hit against lefties. Cabrera doesn’t have much of a platoon split, but he’s hit .255/.325/.355/.680 against lefties and .275/.333/.397/.730 against righties in his career. A RF’er sees ~60 PA’s against LHP over the course of two months, so that’s 60 PA’s from Melky at .255/.325/.355/.680 to Heyward. Diaz? Enormous platoon split. He has hit .276/.334/.387/.722 against RHP, which is below-average for a corner OF, but he has hit .347/.384/.537/.921 against LHP in his career. It’s not a BABIP thing, probably, it’s absurdly high for both splits, he just strikes out a bunch more against RHP and doesn’t hit the ball as hard (9 fewer doubles, 12 fewer homers in 52 more PA’s). The 140 PA’s Diaz would see against RHP go to Heyward.
So, essentially, you’re talking Diaz and Cabrera’s weak platoon sides and throwing them away. Combining their career good half platoon numbers on a 70-30 playing time split leads to a hitter that hits .297/.348/.439/.787 with something closely resembling average defense in LF. Their weak platoons yield a .270/.331/.377/.709 line, and since Diaz is the RH hitter (and thus plays more than 50% of the time in this theoretical reverse-platoon scenario), you’re looking at, at best, -2 or so defense at a corner. And that’s all Heyward has to do to be an upgrade on the roster–be better than the outfielder you get when you combine 70% of Matt Diaz vs. RHP and 30% of Melky Cabrera vs. LHP. That’s basically replacement level production, and that’s if Diaz’s .350 BABIP vs. RHP is sustainable.
Bringing Heyward up immediately has tangible disadvantages apart from the risk he doesn’t hit .270/.331/.377/.709 with at least -2 defense for two months. As always, service time politics play a role, here. Spending two weeks without Heyward on the roster nets the Braves an additional year of service and keeping him down six more weeks essentially makes that additional year of service free. The Braves say they won’t consider that when making their decision, but don’t buy that, they aren’t so incompetent they’ll completely ignore future finances when making such an important decision. So that’s the most important part of the downside to bringing Heyward up to begin the year.
The other part is his development ain’t done, he hit only 17 homers last season and he’s amassed a grand total of 208 PA’s above class A advanced. Of course, he did hit .323/.408/.555 with 51 walks and 51 strikeouts, 25 doubles, 4 triples, and 10 SB’s (1 CS) last season in 422 PA’s. Still, no matter how well a player does, 195 PA’s at AA and 13 PA’s at AAA generally isn’t enough professional experience to complete a players’ development, especially at twenty years old. There are some people in the, “if you bring a player up before he’s ready he’ll never recover” camp. I’m not so sure I am, though it does seem like a bad thing to call a player to the bigs before he’s ready.
However, he’s the number one prospect in all of baseball for a reason and some people (probably including people in the organization) believe he’s ready, despite his relative lack of professional experience. Regardless of what the numbers tell me, he’s the type of player whose scouting reports are constantly ahead of the numbers unless he’s doing his best Barry Bonds impression. So maybe the Braves’ scouts think he’s ready come late March. In that case, I’m forced to trust the Braves’ scouts, because they’re the best in the business at knowing their own.
Anyway, no way to quantify that, so I won’t. We’ll only consider the arbitration politics when making this assessment–the quasi quantifiable part of the picture.
I figure now’s as good a time as any to break out the Time Adjusted Trade Value Calculator (by the way, big problem with the arbitration percentages. Don’t use the arb%, just estimate salaries for now. I’ll correct and re-upload soon.) I’ve got three images, one of Heyward’s trade value if he begins the year with Atlanta, one if he spends two weeks in the minors, and one if he spends two months in the minors. I’m assuming he’s a 3-win player in 2010 if up for the entire year, a 4-win player in 2011, and a 5-win player for the remainder of his contract.
So, keeping the youngster down for two weeks nets the Braves $4 million in surplus value, and keeping him down for six more weeks nets them an additional $6.2 million.
It seems completely obvious to me that keeping him down for two weeks is the correct financial decision. The probability of Heyward being even a +1 win player in a two week span is so minuscule I don’t think you even blink about keeping him in the minors for two weeks. After all, over two weeks a player gets ~50 PA’s. Assuming he adds a full run on defense during those two weeks (good for a +12 pace, an extremely ambitious goal), the break even point for 1 win is a wOBA of about .530, which equates to about a .550 on base average and .750 slugging percentage (1.300 OPS). There’s a non-zero probability that Jason Heyward hits like that for two weeks, anything can happen over 50 PA’s, but not too much greater than zero, and it’s foolish to run a franchise based on those odds. That doesn’t even account for the fact that we already gave Heyward credit for 0.2 wins in the two week period. And he needs to be even more valuable than that, seeing as the Braves don’t pay $4 million per win (unless they’re paying Derek Lowe).
Like I said, keeping Heyward down for six more weeks nets the Braves an additional $6.2 million in surplus value. Considering the position on the Braves’ win curve, Heyward needs to be a ~2.4 win player (0.8 replacement plus 1.6 (6.2/3.88)) over the six week period in order for calling him up two weeks into the season to be a solid financial move. In that case, assuming the same stellar defense as the last scenario, he’ll need to post a .470 wOBA (about a .460 on base average and .675 slugging percentage or a 1.135 OPS) to be worth 2.4 wins. I am willing to bet that Jason Heyward will have at least one six-week stretch of his career in which he posts a .460 on base average and a .675 slugging percentage, but picking out that six week period in time is something I’m not willing to do. And I’m especially unwilling to predict that the first six weeks of his MLB career as a twenty year old will be that stretch.
Basically, it’s going to be impossible for the decision to bring Heyward up before early June to be a financially sound one on paper, but that’s far from the end of the story. If you look at this thing closely enough, it’s impossible to really know what the correct decision is. The real answer gets lost in a cloud of untested variables. For instance, is bringing Heyward up a good baseball decision (good for him, good for others, in some way we can’t quantify)? Is bringing Heyward up on opening day the difference between making the post season tournament? Will the Braves and Heyward agree to a long-term extension at some point before the 2015 season, changing the overall structure and the 2010 implications? How will Heyward’s call up effect ticket and merchandise sales? All of these questions, along with many others, we have little idea of knowing the answer to. The Braves probably have a better idea than we do, as always.
All things considered, I honestly can’t give a definitive answer. After taking everything in, digesting it, and spitting it back out, I’m only a little bit closer to an answer than I was at the beginning of this thought exercise. If I had scouting experience and had seen him play multiple times in, say, AA or the AFL this past year, maybe I’d be better equipped to answer this question, but I’d probably have to see him this upcoming Spring to really make my decision. This won’t be the first question I attempted to answer and came back with, “I have no idea”, but I have no idea when the Braves should call Heyward up. I’m willing to say that keeping him down for at least two weeks is probably the right decision, but I ultimately trust the Braves to make the correct decision. This is pretty much what they do better than anything–develop players.
As a fan, I want to see Heyward starting in RF on opening day, hitting two 5-run homers and throwing out Alfonso Soriano trying to stretch a single into a double.
At this point–and barring an unexpected (at this point) Johnny Damon signing or some other scenario that involves Frank Wren
waving a wand and an outfielder coming out of a hat–it appears that the Braves will begin the season with Jason Heyward in
RF. The organization isn’t saying that, of course. They’re saying things like, “We’re going to give him the opportunity to
win the job this spring”. Which, to me, means they’re going to give him the job. There was a somewhat similar scenario last
season when Jordan Schafer was given the opportunity to win the starting CF job, and he won it out of camp. He was actually
probably the best outfielder on the team at 22 years old until he hurt his wrist and hid the injury from the organization for
nearly two months, which speaks volumes about the quality of the outfielders the Braves possessed last spring. Anyway, I
digress.
The outfield depth chart is significantly better than it was a year ago, but Heyward coult still be a huge upgrade to the
roster. First of all, let’s look at who he’d be replacing.
On the roster, he’d be replacing some run-of-the-mill AAAA outfielder, probably. That’s who would sit in his roster spot for
the first couple of months while his service clock doesn’t tick in Gwinnett. However, that alleged AAAA outfielder wouldn’t
be playing very much, Heyward would be the team’s starting right fielder.
If Heyward fails to win the job out of spring training, the Braves will likely enter ‘09 with an outfield alignment of
Diaz-McLouth-M. Cabrera, left-to-right. If he does, we’re looking at a Diaz/Cabrera platoon in LF, McLouth in CF, and
Heyward in RF. So, if Heyward makes the team, Diaz doesn’t hit against righties and Cabrera doesn’t hit against lefties.
Cabrera doesn’t have much of a platoon split, but he’s hit .255/.325/.355/.680 against lefties and .275/.333/.397/.730
against righties in his career. A RF’er sees ~60 PA’s against LHP over the course of two months, so that’s 60 PA’s from
Melky at .255/.325/.355/.680 to Heyward. Diaz? Enormous platoon split. He has hit .276/.334/.387/.722 against RHP, which
is below-average for a corner OF, but he has hit .347/.384/.537/.921 against LHP in his career. It’s not a BABIP thing,
probably, it’s absurdly high for both splits, he just strikes out a bunch more against RHP and doesn’t hit the ball as hard
(9 fewer doubles, 12 fewer homers in 52 more PA’s). The 140 PA’s Diaz would see against RHP go to Heyward.
So, essentially, you’re talking Diaz and Cabrera’s weak platoon sides and throwing them away. Combining their career good
half platoon numbers on a 70-30 playing time split leads to a hitter that hits .297/.348/.439/.787 with something closely
resembling average defense in LF. Their weak platoons yield a .270/.331/.377/.709 line, and since Diaz is the RH hitter (and
thus plays more than 50% of the time in this theoretical reverse-platoon scenario), you’re looking at, at best, -2 or so
defense at a corner. And that’s all Heyward has to do to be an upgrade on the roster–be better than the outfielder you get
when you combine 70% of Matt Diaz vs. RHP and 30% of Melky Cabrera vs. LHP. That’s basically replacement level production,
and that’s if Diaz’s .350 BABIP vs. RHP is sustainable.
Bringing Heyward up immediately has tangible disadvantages apart from the risk he doesn’t hit .270/.331/.377/.709 with at
least -2 defense for two months. As always, service time politics play a role, here. Spending two weeks without Heyward on
the roster nets the Braves an additional year of service and keeping him down six more weeks essentially makes that
additional year of service free. The Braves say they won’t consider that when making their decision, but don’t buy that,
they aren’t so incompetent they’ll completely ignore future finances when making such an important decision. So that’s the
most important part of the downside to bringing Heyward up to begin the year.
The other part is his development ain’t done, he hit only 17 homers last season and he’s amassed a grand total of 208 PA’s
above class A advanced. Of course, he did hit .323/.408/.555 with 51 walks and 51 strikeouts, 25 doubles, 4 triples, and 10
SB’s (1 CS) last season in 422 PA’s. Still, no matter how well a player does, 195 PA’s at AA and 13 PA’s at AAA generally
isn’t enough professional experience to complete a players’ development, especially at twenty years old. There are some
people in the, “if you bring a player up before he’s ready he’ll never recover” camp. I’m not so sure I am, though it does
seem like a bad thing to call a player to the bigs before he’s ready.
However, he’s the number one prospect in all of baseball for a reason and some people (probably including people in the
organization) believe he’s ready, despite his relative lack of professional experience. Regardless of what the numbers tell
me, he’s the type of player whose scouting reports are constantly ahead of the numbers unless he’s doing his best Barry Bonds
impression. So maybe the Braves’ scouts think he’s ready come late March. In that case, I’m forced to trust the Braves’
scouts, because they’re the best in the business at knowing their own.
Anyway, no way to quantify that, so I won’t. We’ll only consider the arbitration politics when making this assessment–the
quasi quantifyable part of the picture.
I figure now’s as good a time as any to break out the Time Adjusted Trade Value Calculator (by the way, big problem with the
arbitration percentages. Don’t use the arb%, just estimate salaries for now. I’ll correct and re-upload soon.) I’ve got
three images, one of Heyward’s trade value if he begins the year with Atlanta, one if he spends two weeks in the minors, and
one if he spends two months in the minors. I’m assuming he’s a 3-win player in 2010 if up for the entire year, a 4-win
player in 2011, and a 5-win player for the remainder of his contract.
Topics: Atlanta Braves | 4 Comments »
Time Adjusted Trade Value Calculator (Beta)
By CapitolAvenueClub | February 4, 2010
I’ve finished the preliminary work and I’ve developed the beta version of the Time Adjusted Trade Value Calculator–one of the ultimate goals of this project. Before I get into formally introducing it, I want to spend a bit of time discussing the model that we’re working with. If we all understand and agree upon the model, something I think we can do, then discussions concerning this topic will be a lot more productive.
As I discussed in Part I of this series, when sabermetricians calculate trade value, they generally determine how many wins a player is worth, multiply that by the marginal value of a win, and subtract the player’s salary. The basic framework has NOT changed, that’s still what we’re doing. My model is basically the same thing that we’ve been using for years. All this model does is fine tune a few things so that it mirrors reality a bit better.
The first thing my model does to improve the current one is adjust for the time value of money. A dollar today is more valuable than a dollar in the future and that’s something that we sometimes ignore in trade value analysis.
The second thing my model does to improve the current one is adjust for the time value of wins. A win today is more valuable than a win in the future–something we’ve completely ignored. I discussed the theory of uncertainty of future winscapes at length in part I.
The third thing my model does to improve the current one is adjust for a team’s position on the win curve. Adding a win to an 85 win team has a lot more utility than doing the same to a 65 win team or a 105 win team.
So, the model is, quite simply, a player’s win value (adjusted for time) times the marginal value of a win (adjusted for position on the win curve) minus a player’s salary (adjusted for time) equals his trade value.
That’s it. That’s the model and it’s the exact same thing that we’re currently using. It’s only in the parenthetical statements, the adjustments, that my model deviates from that of what we’ve been using.
So, now that we have the model, we now spend many hours debating as to how to define each parameter in the model. I’ll present what I’ve done to define each parameter so far and we’ll let the discussion go from there. By the way, in no way am I asserting that these are the best ways to define each parameter, only the best ways I know of/can manage to. If you’re familiar with a better way to quantify something, SPEAK UP! I want input on this, I’m not smart enough to do this all by myself.
For a player’s win value, you can use whatever you want. It’s usually some forecast of the Wins Above Replacement metric, that seems to be what people are most comfortable with.
Adjusting that for time is a more open ended discussion. I’ve used the present value formula to calculate the time discount and made the rate of return adjustable. When you open the file, you’ll see a 6% discount rate. Let me explain how I came up with this figure. Basically, the question I attempted to answer was, “What are the chances a win is completely useless in the future”. I used Steve Sommer’s win curve to determine when adding an additional win is useless–about 80 wins. I accounted for variance by subtracting a standard deviation, then accounted for the noise of the data by subtracting the standard error of true talent level (measured by fWAR) regressed on actual wins. At that point, the probability of a team contending is so small, even if their true talent level jumps a standard deviation due to variance or error in measurement or whatever and the standard error of the win value metric vs. actual wins is accounted for entirely by over achievement, they still stand very little chance of contending. I used a χ²-distribution to calculate the probability of a team being that bad (a ~64.5 win team, 10.3 accounted for in SD of win values and 5.2 accounted for in standard error of win values vs. actual wins) in terms of true talent level. It’s 6%. Like I said, this is an open ended discussion and if you have any thoughts as to better ways to quantify this, please speak.
The marginal value of a win is another one that’s sort of open ended. I used Steve’s win curve with a $3.4 million per win base to calculate the marginal value of a win based on position on the win curve. Here is a table in which I’ve listed the marginal value of a win for each position on the win curve. The first column represents the range of true talent level, the second the marginal value of a win in million dollars:
| L=<W<U | MVOW ($M) |
| 0-74 | $2.98 |
| 74-83 | $3.48 |
| 83-88 | Function |
| 88-162 | $3.48 |
You’ll note that when a team’s true talent level is between 83 and 88 wins the cost of a marginal win is calculated via function. This represents the “curve” part of the graph, the portion where the marginal value of a win is constantly changing depending on talent level. In essence, the MVOwinscape is a piece wise function in which the first derivative = 0 for everywhere except the 83-88 win range. I ran a polynomial best fit regression on the data between 83 and 88 wins, whose equation I used as my function to calculate the marginal value of a win for a team whose true talent level lies somewhere between 83 and 88 wins.
This, however, raises a big problem. Where does a team fall on the win curve in the future? I really don’t have a good answer (like I said, I’m not smart enough to do this all by myself). The only way I know how to handle this problem is to regress talent level to the mean, but how and over what time period? The how part I’m far from confident I’ve done correctly, I simply regress it in equal increments for lack of an idea of how to do it better. The over what time period part I’ve got a pretty good idea how to handle. Thanks to much assistance from Colin Wyers’ database articles, this research went a lot faster than anticipated, but what I’ve found is that teams’ current records have zero predictive value of their record five years from now and beyond. Therefore, I regress their record to the mean in five equal increments (once each year) and assume league average true talent level thereafter. This doesn’t mirror reality as well as I’d like, but it’s pretty much the best I can do given my mathematical skill set and lack of a crystal ball.
Player’s salary is the one thing there isn’t much debate on. It’s a noise-free variable, just enter his salary. Adjusting for the time value of money is simple, I just used the present value formula. The rate of return is adjustable, use whatever you think is correct. I’ve entered 8%. You’ll see a column called “PV (M)” in the TATVC (Beta), which represents the present value of a player’s future salary. I elected to keep the “Sal (M)” column intact for illustrative purposes.
So, let’s give this thing a try.
First of all, do NOT edit anything other than the green spaces. There is a second sheet in this document. It is extremely important not to edit anything on the second sheet. As always, I recommend saving two copies of the file, an archived copy and a working copy. I always edit the working copy, then paste the results into a third spreadsheet and only use the archive copy to recover a damaged working copy. The basic instructions for using this tool can be found at Beyond the Box Score. There are three additional parameters, true talent level, rate of return on money, and rate of return on wins. I’ve entered the details for Tim Hudson’s three year deal in the green boxes, I’ve estimated he’ll be a 3.5 win player in 2010, 3.0 in 2011, and 2.5 in 2012. I’ve entered his $9 million salaries for 2010-2012 and his $1 million buyout for 2013. I’ve estimated the Braves are an 85 or so win team, an 8% rate of return on money, a 6% rate of return on wins, and $5 million for draft pick compensation. So, we come up with a surplus of about $12.5 million, or, a top 76-100 hitter.
| Tim Hudson | True Talent Level: | 85 | |||
| Year | Sal (M) | PV (M) | Wins | Val (M) | Net (M) |
| 2010 | $9.0 | $9.0 | 3.5 | $14.0 | $5.0 |
| 2011 | $9.0 | $8.3 | 3.0 | $11.0 | $2.0 |
| 2012 | $9.0 | $7.7 | 2.5 | $8.3 | -$0.7 |
| 2013 | $1.0 | $0.8 | -$1.0 | ||
| FA Picks | $5.0 | ||||
| Total | $28.0 | $25.8 | 9.0 | $38.3 | $12.5 |
Our previous model had Tim Hudson’s trade value at $8.8 million. Adjusting for the time value of money, wins, and position on the win curve leads to a more valuable contract for the Braves. Consider, he’s an older player, and their contracts tend to be front-heavy in the win department, and the wins next year are more valuable than wins in 2012. Also, the Braves figure to be competitive during 2010 and if all goes well in 2011 and 2012, too, which makes the wins more valuable. Third, he’s paid $9 million each year, and $9 million in 2010 is worth more than $9 million in 2012.
The old model:
| Tim Hudson | ||||
| Year | Sal (M) | Wins | Val (M) | Net (M) |
| 2010 | $9.0 | 3.5 | $12.3 | $3.3 |
| 2011 | $9.0 | 3.0 | $10.6 | $1.6 |
| 2012 | $9.0 | 2.5 | $8.9 | -$0.1 |
| 2013 | $1.0 | -$1.0 | ||
| FA Picks | $5.0 | |||
| Total | $28.0 | 9.0 | $36.8 | $8.8 |
Let’s do another one, why don’t we? Mike Cameron, why don’t we?
The Red Sox true talent level is somewhere in the mid 90’s range. I picked 93. Using the same rate of return on money (8%) and the same rate of return on wins (6%), filling in his projected win values (3.6 (Fans projection) in 2010, -0.5 in 2011), and his $7.75 million average annual salary we see that his contract is worth about $13.6 million in excess value to the Red Sox.
| Mike Cameron | True Talent Level: | 93 | |||
| Year | Sal (M) | PV (M) | Wins | Val (M) | Net (M) |
| 2010 | $7.8 | $7.8 | 3.6 | $12.9 | $5.2 |
| 2011 | $7.8 | $7.2 | 3.1 | $10.6 | $2.9 |
| FA Picks | $5.0 | ||||
| Total | $15.5 | $15.0 | 6.7 | $28.5 | $13.6 |
The old model wasn’t too far off in this case, coming in at $13.1 million.
| Mike Cameron | ||||
| Year | Sal (M) | Wins | Val (M) | Net (M) |
| 2010 | $7.8 | 3.6 | $12.6 | $4.9 |
| 2011 | $7.8 | 3.1 | $10.9 | $3.2 |
| FA Picks | $5.0 | |||
| Total | $15.5 | 6.7 | $28.6 | $13.1 |
At this point I turn it over to you in the spirit of sabermetric peer review. Use this tool however you please, and if you have a suggestion to make it better, I’d like to hear it. Special thanks to Sky Kalman, Steve Sommer, and Colin Wyers whose work was instrumental in putting this together.
Topics: Atlanta Braves | 4 Comments »
The ‘10 Braves — Starting Pitchers
By CapitolAvenueClub | February 2, 2010
This was the biggest strength of the Braves in 2009. After 2008, a year that saw four older and/or injury prone pitchers go down long-term, Frank Wren went crazy and acquired three big league starters despite the presence of 1) a good 23-year old who pitched close to 200 innings in 2008 and already has a season and a half of MLB experience under his belt, 2) a 22-year old phenom knocking on the door, 3) another apt 22-year old at his heels, and 4) a thirty year old that showed promise in 158 and 2/3 innings during 2008 that could be retained for virtually nothing. Not to mention the presence of three or four other organizational options.
Though some may question the logic, it’s hard to argue with the results. The three new starters provided plenty of quality starting pitching. In all, the group made 91 starts plus Kenshin Kawakami’s 13 and 2/3 innings in relief. They totaled 570 and 1/3 innings (6.12 per start) with a 3.76 ERA, a 1.28 WHIP, and a 454-to-164 strikeout-to-walk ratio (7.16 K/9, 2.59 BB/9, 2.77 K/BB). The team’s other 71 starts were made by Jair Jurrjens (34), Tommy Hanson (21), Tim Hudson (7), Jo Jo Reyes (5), and Kris Medlen (4). Of the two groups, two from the former group figure to return and four from the latter group (including the emergency starter) figure to return. Overall the group ranked as one of baseball’s best rotations. The same should be true, though perhaps to a lesser degree, next season.
Losing Javier Vazquez makes any rotation in baseball worse, though due to the rotation depth the Braves possessed the replacement level was rather high, which softens the blow quite a bit. Rather than Vazquez, the Braves will go into 2010 with Tommy Hanson, Tim Hudson, Jair Jurrjens, Derek Lowe, and Kenshin Kawakami in their rotation. It’s still an outstanding group, but, like I said, no rotation in baseball is better off without Javier Vazquez than they are with him.
The best pitcher in the rotation is Tommy Hanson, who has just short 130 MLB innings under his belt. Still, considering how well he has pitched–both statistically and from other talent-evaluation perspectives–for the past two years, I’m perfectly comfortable calling the 23 year old Hanson the best pitcher in the rotation. He throws four pitches, a low-to-mid 90’s fastball that he’ll occasionally dial up to 96 or so with good tailing action, a power slider that grades as a 60, a 12-6 curve ball that also grades as a 60, and an occasional low-80’s change up that can be anywhere from a 35 to a 50. In the majors last season he struck out 116 batters in 127 and 2/3 innings, including 98 in June, July, August, and September over 98 and 2/3 innings. Before getting the call, he struck out 90 batters in 66 and 1/3 innings at class AAA Gwinnett, making him one of two pitchers in the organization to record at least 200 total strikeouts in 2009. If Hanson stays healthy it’s only a matter of time before he does something incredible, perhaps as soon as 2010. I think it’s fair to expect around 200-220 innings from Hanson in 2010 with around 200 strikeouts and 55-70 walks, making him one of the more valuable assets in baseball. If he isn’t paid a visit by the bad luck fairy and doesn’t have trouble keeping the ball in the park next season, well, he’ll probably be in the conversation for the Cy Young. I’m not uncomfortable making that prediction, not in the least.
Nobody else in the rotation has that kind of upside unless they’ve gotten fundamentally better over the off season, but two others figure to be rock solid, above average starters–somewhere between 3 and 5 wins, in terms of value. Jair Jurrjens and Tim Hudson. Jurrjens is coming off a pair of strange seasons. His batted ball peripherals look like they came from two different pitchers but his fielding independent peripherals are nearly identical. I don’t know what to make of this. Rather than explain them to you, I’m going to display an image that is a visualization of the trends of Jair Jurrjens’ batted ball profiles the past two seasons. Brought to you through the miracle of Open Office and Microsoft Paint:
I’ve also prepared a table of his rates of the five batted ball types (infield fly, outfield fly, home run, ground ball, and line drive) per batted ball:
| 2008 | 2009 | |
| FB INF | 4.3% | 5.0% |
| FB HR | 1.9% | 2.3% |
| FB OF | 34.7% | 41.2% |
| GB | 39.6% | 34.8% |
| LD | 19.6% | 16.6% |
I don’t really understand it. In 2009 he struck out and walked batters at nearly the exact same rate as he did in 2008. In 2009 he induced fewer ground balls and line drives, which resulted in a lot more fly balls. These fly balls were hit out of the park at virtually the same rate (4.3% to 4.7% per fly ball and 1.9% to 2.3% per batted ball) and were hit on tne infield at virtually the same rate (11% per fly ball, 4.3% to 5.0% per batted ball). That means he allowed a lot more outfield fly balls (204 in 2008, 263 in 2009, 34.7% per batted ball in 2008, 41.2% per batted ball in 2009). Somehow allowing a ton more outfield fly balls resulted in a 33 point decrease in batting average on balls in play. This doesn’t seem intuitive and is highly indicative of something abnormal. The simplest explanation is luck and better positioned defenders, though a 3% decrease in line drives is consistent with a drop in BABIP. Perhaps the outfield flys were more weakly hit, I don’t know. I’m told increasing FB% is also consistent with drop in BABIP, though the Braves’ outfielders were so bad in 2009 I’m not sure that was the case for that team.
Regardless, what we have here is a young, durable starter with average strikeout and walk rates to go along with above-average batted ball peripherals, which is incredibly valuable. Jurrjens’ 2.60 2009 ERA is probably not sustainable, but something like 2008’s 3.68 ERA is probably close to the truth, and 220 innings of ~3.68 ERA is extremely useful.
Tim Hudson, the other one that figures to be a solid, above-average starter, is working off of a much larger sample, though presents some uncertainty given he’s only 18 months or so removed from tommy john surgery. Like Billy Wagner, he pitched extremely well immediately before and after his surgery, so I’m not too concerned, but you always worry about a 34 year old pitcher who is 42 and 1/3 innings removed from having his elbow re built. In his 11 year career, Hudson owns a 3.49 ERA, a 1.257 WHIP, a 6.1 K/9, a 2.8 BB/9, and a 2.22 K/BB. He’s an extreme ground ball pitcher, having induced 1.42 ground balls for every fly ball in his career, resulting in a batting average on balls in play (.287) twelve points below league average (.299) for his career.
Tim Hudson throws pretty much every pitch known to man. Well, not quite, but the six most common types of pitches in MLB (fastballs, sliders, curve balls, change ups, splitters, and cutters) Hudson has thrown in his career. It’s anyone’s guess what he’ll mostly throw in 2010, though it’s a virtual certainty that his 2-seam fastball (sinker) will be at the head of his repertoire. He’ll go with whatever off speed stuff feels the best that day or he thinks will be most effective. His repertoire start to start may change more than any other pitcher in baseball. He’ll throw the change up twenty times in one start then put it away and not throw it again for another month, for example.
His value will depend on how much he’s able to pitch, but I guess a conservative estimate of his value would be around 1 win per 50 innings.
The last two spots in the rotation will be occupied by Derek Lowe and Kenshin Kawakami, both of whom I expect to be worth at least two wins in 2010.
I’ve covered Derek Lowe ad nauseum, particularly here. The thing about Lowe is, no matter how much of his decline is an aberration or fundamental skill loss, the dude pitches so much, even if his fundamental skills are as bad as his ‘09 numbers would indicate, he’s going to be a 2+ win player. Barring any unprecedented injury (he’s rarely been injured apart from minor blister issues), he’ll pitch close to 200 innings, and even with a 4.06 FIP that’s valuable. It may not be $15 million valuable and sadly (or not) that’s the standard he’ll be judged against, but there is inherent value in a durable, average-to-above-average-ish pitcher. Having a guy you can slot in the 4th spot of your rotation that gives you 200 innings and a 4.30 ERA is something a lot of teams, even good teams, would love to have. Of course, they’re not going to be willing to commit $60 million for it, but that’s a sunk cost at this point and from an on field value perspective Derek Lowe is very useful, he’s a well above-average 4th starter. He also comes with some upside, given it’s not likely that all of his ‘09 woes can be attributed to a fundamental decline, so anything he gives you on top of that is gravy. I won’t say the Braves don’t need Lowe to be a 4 win pitcher like he was in LA and like the Braves thought they were getting, but if he’s simply a 2.5 win pitcher, all’s far from lost.
Kenshin Kawakami is the most difficult of the bunch to predict. He’s only pitched 156 and 1/3 MLB innings, which is a small fraction of what I’d like to have when evaluating a player, and he has no minor league data. I know little about translating NPB data and the 156 and 1/3 MLB innings are rather noisy, given the adjustments he had to make throughout the season (bigger, slicker baseball, different hitters, different strike zone, et cetera). In the aforementioned 156 and 1/3 innings, he was worth ~1.7 wins according to fWAR. However, I don’t know if we can expect him to improve his win/IP rate in 2010 or not. He was known as a control specialist in Japan, but walked 57 in MLB last season. He’ll be 35 next season but he’s shown little signs of decline thus far. He walked only 34 in his final 105 innings (2.91 BB/9), covering June, July, August, September, and October. I wonder if we can expect Kawakami to improve that walk rate in 2010.
Last year Kawakami threw a low-90’s/high-80’s fastball, a plus cutter, a slow curve, a forkball, and a shuuto. His pitches are difficult to track, two of them are rather rare in MLB and easily mistaken for other pitches.
I know little else about him. He was mostly healthy in 2009, but the Braves were cautious and limited his innings. I wonder how many he’ll be able to pitch. If he stays healthy, something in the 2-3 win range seems appropriate.
The emergency starter, Kris Medlen, is arguably just as good as Derek Lowe and Kenshin Kawakami, if not better, but he’s Kawakami’s size and has something on the order of 10% of the professional experience Kawakami and Lowe do. If anyone is injured, Medlen will assume a starting role, where I suspect he’ll pitch well enough for the Braves to think twice about putting him back in the bullpen.
I covered him previously in the relievers write up.
I have no idea who the 7th starter on the depth chart is and I don’t care to find out. I’m sure the organization shares this sentiment.
Topics: Atlanta Braves | 7 Comments »
Organizational plateaus from 2009
By CapitolAvenueClub | February 1, 2010
One of the first things I ever wrote about baseball involved doing an exercise just like this. I figure it’s appropriate to bring it back up. It’s called big seasons, and basically I’m looking at certain statistical plateaus in the organization. Starting with Strikeouts.
200 Strikeout seasons
Javier Vazquez (238) – He’s not back for 2010, so I don’t suppose I have much to say, except kick-ass season.
Tommy Hanson (206) – Yeah, he only struck out 116 in the big show, but he also struck out 90 in 66 and 1/3 innings with the class AAA Gwinnett Braves.
150 Strikeout seasons
Jair Jurrens (152) – Not his strength, but he still managed to rack up 152 in 215 innings.
J.J. Hoover (150) – Barely made the list, but he’s the only minor leaguer to do so. Accumulated all but two of them in class A Rome.
100 Strikeout seasons (Non-majors starters edition)
Randall Delgado (141) – In 124 innings at class A Rome. He battled a minor injury or two, and would’ve made the 150 club if he’d been fully healthy.
Jacob Thompson (119) – In 154 and 1/3 innings in Rome and Myrtle Beach with 56 walks. Nothing noteworthy.
Zeke Spruill (118) – The kid shows promise.
Richard Sullivan (115) – He climbed the ladder quite a bit in 2009, finishing at AA as a 22 year old. A 115-to-54 strikeout-to-walk ratio in 154 innings leaves something to be desired, though.
Scott Diamond (111) – Acceptable strikeout rate for a left at AA makes him a fringe prospect.
Edgar Osuna (107) – He’ll be getting shelled in Kansas City in a few months.
Todd Redmond (106) – In 145 innings at AAA Gwinnett. With 47 walks. And 152 hits. Everything screams “organizational filler”.
Dimaster Delgado (104) – Probably the last year of this soft-tossing lefty’s career that we’ll be talking about his above-average strikeout rate, but he’s still a fairly interesting prospect.
Cole Rohrbough (100) – Everyone wants to forget him, but he’s still right here.
100 Strikeout seasons (Relievers edition)
Kris Medlen (116) – Fifty three were in MLB relief, nineteen were in MLB starts, and 44 were in AAA. All in all, his 9.97 K/9 in 104 and 2/3 innings across two levels is outstanding, though I don’t really know where to put him.
Craig Kimbrel (112) – Extremely rare for a pure relief prospect to make this list. Goes to show just how talented Kimbrel is.
Rafael Soriano (102) – In 75 and 1/3 MLB relief innings. He was filthy last year. But, like Vazquez, he won’t be back in 2010, so I’m hardly inclined to comment.
100 Walk seasons
Matt Young (116) – I really like this kid, though he’s rather old.
Chipper Jones (101) – Even in a down year.
50 Walk seasons
Nate McLouth (70) – Includes his time with Pittsburgh.
Adam LaRoche (69) – Includes his time with Pittsburgh and Boston.
Cody Johnson (67) – With 180 strikeouts and 32 homers, fifty two per cent of his plate appearances ended in one of the “three true outcomes”.
Gregor Blanco (67) – He can walk with the best of them, but a .231 batting average and .287 slugging percentage won’t get anything done in the big leagues unless you’re drawing three-to-four times as many walks as Blanco did in 2009.
Wes Timmons (62) – Can’t really play anywhere but 1B and slugged .366 at Gwinnett last year. Thirty years old next season. Hit only one homer in 413 PA’s.
Brandon Hicks (61) – He had a bad year, but he still drew his walks and hit for some power, and hope endures.
Yunel Escobar (57) – That’ll play with a .300 average and a .140 ISO at SS any day.
Brooks Conrad (56) – Doesn’t belong on a MLB roster anywhere.
Brandon Jones (54) – Welcome to Pittsburgh, you’ll be missed…. In Gwinnett.
Barbaro Canizares (52) – I don’t even know if he’s still in the organization, but he’s useful for something in MLB, though I’m not quite sure what, yet.
Brian McCann (51) – The next closest catcher is J.C. Boscon, our very own Crash Davis, with 37.
Travis Jones (50) – Barely on the list, barely worth mentioning.
30 Home Run seasons
Cody Johnson (32) – The Phillies had four times as many major leaguers hit thirty home runs than the Braves had players in their entire organization.
25 Home Run seasons
Adam LaRoche (25) – Only 12 were with Atlanta and he’ll be playing in Arizona next year.
20 Home Run seasons
Gerardo Rodriguez (23) – The other full season power hitting prospect.
Brian McCann (21) – The best catcher in the NL.
Nate McLouth (20) – Includes his time with Pittsburgh. He’s a good bet to repeat or top that in 2010.
35 Doubles seasons
Adam LaRoche (38) – Would’ve hit forty, but heard his favorite song playing from the clubhouse, got distracted, and stopped at 1B twice.
Martin Prado (38) – If he keeps this up, he’ll be an all star fairly soon.
Brian McCann (38) – Your MLB leader in homers and doubles is a catcher. Nice job.
30 Doubles seasons
Donell Linares (33) – He also hit 15 homers, but that’s about where the good ends for this 25 year old.
Barbaro Canizares (32) – I’ve got nothing to add.
Matt Young (31) – 11 triples, too. Rare to see a guy have more singles than doubles, more doubles than triples, and more triples than homers (7).
Freddie Freeman (30) – About time Freeman made a list.
Topics: Atlanta Braves | 1 Comment »
The ‘10 Braves — Base Running
By CapitolAvenueClub | February 1, 2010
This is a topic I’m admittedly mostly unfamiliar with. Or, less familiar with it than most other facets of the game. I’ll try my best.
Running the bases was the one thing the Braves were beyond awful at in 2009. They left something to be desired on defense and at the plate–especially with respect to power–but it wasn’t all bad, they hit a lot of doubles and had a few plus defenders. However, virtually everything on the base paths was a complete blunder. Nothing positive happened.
For starters, the team was visually frustrating on the base paths. They largely had trouble scoring from second on a single and from first on a double. They rarely took risks on the base paths–for better or worse–ranking second to last in the league in stolen bases with fifty eight and last in the league in triples with twenty. Of course, they were caught stealing the fewest number of times in the league, twenty eight times, and their 69 per cent success rate is close enough to the break even point. Still, every time they tried to steal a base they were essentially wasting their time. The Phillies, by contrast, were caught only twice more than the Braves, but stole sixty one more bases.
They ranked twenty ninth of thirty teams in Baseball Prospectus’ Equivalent Base Running Runs, only the Orioles ranked worse.
I don’t see any reason they’ll be much better in 2010. Martin Prado is a far worse base runner than Kelly Johnson. Troy Glaus to Casey Kotchman to Adam LaRoche is essentially a push, I’d think, if not a downgrade. No matter what Yunel’s real age is (they say 27, I don’t know), he’s past the age in which age makes him a better base runner, though he could stop making terrible base running errors, which would be an upgrade. Chipper Jones isn’t getting any younger. Brian McCann was far below average last year, despite losing a lot of weight in the off season. The team’s best base runners last year were probably Omar Infante, Ryan Church, Jordan Schafer, and the aforementioned Kelly Johnson. Johnson and Church won’t return, Infante is a role player, and Schafer will, in all likelihood, spend the majority of the season in AAA. Jason Heyward is certainly an upgrade over Garret Anderson, but Garret Anderson was surprising not terrible on the base paths, rating only half a run below average by BPro’s previously cited base running metric, and Jason Heyward isn’t anything closely resembling an asset on the base paths (though certainly not a liability). Melky Cabrera is decent enough on the base paths, I guess, he rated 0.4 runs above average last year. All in all, most of the semi-positive was eradicated and all of the dead weight is a year older. The Braves are counting on a couple of under-25 year olds to take them out of MLB’s base running cellar.
Expect another miserable year on the base paths. I used to blame Snitker for a lot of it. I’m not so sure it’s his fault anymore.
All things considered, if there’s an offensive category you have to suck at, base running is the first one you pick, so all’s not lost, I guess. It is annoying to watch incompetent base running night in and night out, though, which is probably what we’re dealing with.
Topics: Atlanta Braves | 7 Comments »
Poll Visual Aid
By CapitolAvenueClub | January 31, 2010
There is a new poll, by the way.
Topics: Atlanta Braves | No Comments »
The ‘10 Braves — Relievers
By CapitolAvenueClub | January 30, 2010
Many fans feared for the state of the 2010 bullpen early in the off season, given the all but certain departures of Mike Gonzalez and Rafael Soriano and all the subsequent uncertainty. However, Frank Wren clearly made this a top priority for his off-season, acquiring four relievers over its course, including two via trade (Jesse Chavez and Michael Dunn) and two via free agency (Billy Wagner and Takashi Saito). He imported more than he lost (Rafael Soriano, Mike Gonzalez, and Boone Logan), and the new additions along with the promising and fully healthy core (Peter Moylan, Kris Medlen, and Eric O’Flaherty), should make for an even better bullpen in 2010.
People always say, “it’s good to have a hall of famer on your team”. I don’t know that that’s true, necessarily, however the Braves certainly have one, Chipper Jones, and they’re extremely lucky to have him. They probably added another this off season in Billy Wagner (whose merits for the hall of fame are up to debate and I don’t do hall of fame debates). He brings that sort of hall of fame worth pedigree to your team, sure, but he also happens to be really good at what he does–pitch mostly short relief in high leverage situations (or just period). Some are concerned about his health, given he had a rehab themed season in 2009. However, he’s already returned to action and by the time pitchers and catchers report he’ll be eighteen months removed from his tommy john surgery. I mentioned he’s returned to action, and in case you missed it, he pitched extremely well. During his time with the Mets and the Red Sox during the 2009 regular season he faced sixty three total batters. Twenty six of them struck out, eight walked, eight managed a hit, one was hit by a pitch, two sacrificed, and eighteen recorded an out on a ball in play. His average fastball velocity was 94.2 miles per hour and his slider was worth 2.8 runs above average in only 15 and 2/3 innings. I think it’s safe to say he’s back and fully healthy, having not missed a beat. Actually, I see the fact that he hasn’t pitched but just short of sixteen innings in the past year as a tremendous advantage. I’m a believer in the cumulative-reset theory of injury and steep decline, I guess.
Takashi Saito might be the one that concerns me the most. He had a 2.43 ERA in 2009 with Boston, but that ERA was somewhat of a delusion. His 52-to-25 strikeout-to-walk ratio is poor for a late innings reliever in itself, and batters managed fifty hits in 55 and 2/3 innings and a .701 OPS off of him in 2009 on account of twelve extra base hits, including six homers. Best explanation for his 2.43 ERA is the absurd 89.4 left on base percentage. That’s not a repeatable skill, that’s luck, and unless Takashi Saito gets fundamentally better or lucky again, he’s not going to post a 2.43 ERA. He allowed a lot more fly balls in 2009 than he traditionally had and his slider wasn’t as effective as it had been for his career to that point. I’d expect regression, but he did have a sort of rehab themed season in 2009, so it’s possible that he’s just now fully healthy and will fundamentally improve in 2010. I don’t know how likely that is for a forty year old, though. I didn’t watch him pitch in 2009, but the fact that his average leverage index in 2009 was 0.67 suggests the Red Sox trusted him about as much as I do–that is, not at all. The Braves are expecting Saito to be a viable late innings option. I don’t think they can really count on him for that. I’m also worried about Bobby’s usage patterns and Saito. A forty year old with recent injury history probably won’t be able to stand the kind of abuse Mike Gonzalez and Rafael Soriano endured last year.
Peter Moylan came back from tommy john surgery at least a month ahead of schedule in 2009 and made the team out of spring training, something that was virtually unprecedented. He struggled a bit early on, but during July, August, September, and October, he posted a 1.80 ERA, a 1.31 WHIP, and a 36-to-17 strikeout-to-walk ratio in 42 and 2/3 innings. He’s been labeled a ground ball specialist, something he certainly excels at, having posted a career 1.66 GB/FB ratio, but that label is usually reserved for someone who doesn’t do much else well, and Moylan is certainly not that person. Left handers have always hit him (.263/.375/.355) better than right handers (.210/.269/.300), so the Braves will probably use him as a set up man, but I still think he’s good enough to be a closer for someone some day.
If there’s another guy in the bullpen that worries me, it’s Eric O’Flaherty. Not just because of what he can and can’t do, but because of what the organization may expect him to do–pitch complete innings. Eric O’Flaherty was claimed off waivers last winter in hopes that his previous major league results were an aberration due to injury. He pitched well for the Braves in 2010, posting a 3.04 ERA, a 1.243 WHIP, and a 39-to-18 strikeout-to-walk ratio. However, he was used primarily as a left-handed specialist, seeing nearly fifty per cent (116 of 236) of the batters he faced hit left-handed. He was extremely effective against them, posting a 24-to-6 strikeout-to-walk ratio, but much less effective against right handers, posting a 15-to-12 strikeout-to-walk ratio. He throws a sinker, a slider with good tilt and little depth, and a change-up–which he threw more than any other time in his career in 2009. Posted the highest GB/FB ratio of his career in 2009–1.22. He’s plenty good enough to be a late innings left handed specialist, but probably not good enough against right handers to be an otherwise viable set up man.
The “long man” is what Kris Medlen’s title will presumably be, though he’s probably a better pitcher than any of the late innings group apart from Billy Wagner. Medlen reminds me a lot of Javier Vazquez–a generally hittable control pitcher who racks up a ton of K’s and issues few free passes. The generally hittable part seems to irritate people in general, but it’s still immensely valuable. Many would make a pretty good argument that he belongs in the rotation. I can’t really disagree, but that doesn’t seem like an option. His ‘09 stats aren’t the prettiest in the world, but he was very good as a reliever and posted a higher strikeout rate than Tommy Hanson in ‘09. His change up is his best pitch, he also throws a low-90’s fastball, a slider, and a curveball. He’s a future starter and will step in if any of the starters succumb to injury or shitty performance, but for now, he’ll be in the bullpen. Seems like the type that can step in and pick up a twelve out save or something. The quality 6th starter is the biggest utility he brings to the Braves, but I’m confident he could flourish as a late innings reliever.
I must confess that I know little about Jesse Chavez. That’s what happens when you stick a fairly unremarkable reliever in Pittsburgh for seven years. He’ll be twenty six years old next season and still has little MLB experience, only 82 and 1/3 innings. His AAA stats are good and his stuff is decent at worst. He throws hard, averaging around 94-95 MPH with his fastball, and he throws a plus slider and a change up that can be above average at times. His fastball moves, well, not at all, so people tend to predict lots of fly balls and, thus, lots of home runs from him. He should strike out enough batters to warrant a roster spot. His game needs to improve to become anything more than a junk innings guy, but the Braves have a need there, and it’s better to use a guy with some upside in that role than the other alternatives.
The seventh spot in the bullpen is mostly up for grabs. Some candidates:
Jo Jo Reyes – You know about him, but I’m not ready to give up on him, and neither is the organization.
Manny Acosta – I’m not ready to give up on him, either. Filthy stuff.
Michael Dunn – Hard throwing lefty, not a lot of mileage on his arm, walks way too many batters.
Craig Kimbrel – The right-handed Billy Wagner according to Frank Wren. His control doesn’t even exist, I don’t think. Plus Plus stuff.
Lee Hyde – Good enough to pitch out of a bullpen right now. Throws a fastball with plus velocity and a knuckle curve. There’s a solid, if unremarkable, future for this kid.
Luis Valdez – He’ll be twenty six next season, but he’s kicked ass as a reliever at AA and AAA for the past two seasons. I wouldn’t be disappointed to see him in the bigs.
Todd Redmond – The proverbial “junk innings and emergency starter if Medlen is forced to join the rotation full time” guy. I can’t imagine a scenario in which Todd Redmond joins the team and makes it better.
Scott Proctor – The one I always forget and almost did just now. Had success with the Yankees. He’ll be 33 years old next season, coming off a year which he missed entirely due to injury. Anything the Braves get from Proctor is gravy, but he’s a nice upside play.
Topics: Atlanta Braves | 2 Comments »
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